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INTRODUCTION
Since the appearance in 1966 of the Coleman Report, Equality of Educational
Opportunity,' social science researchers have been attacking one of America's
most cherished beliefs: that education may be used as an instrument to reduce
social inequality. 2 Social scientists of national reputation, including the
Coleman team members of the faculty seminar at Harvard which reanalyzed
the Coleman Report findings,3 and Christopher Jencks4 and others, claim
that beyond some minimum per pupil expenditure level, statistical rela-
tionships between dollars spent per pupil and student performance on
standardized tests do not exist. Put another way, higher expenditures do
not produce higher student achievement. Home background and other
socioeconomic factors account for variations in pupil achievement, not in-
equalities in school expenditures.
These research findings have not been relegated to some dusty corner of
academia.5 As the cost of public education has soared and the demand for
accountability by state legislatures gathered momentum, the Coleman Report
and similar research has been cited by policymakers who question whether
increasing school expenditures will improve the quality of education. The
issue has also emerged in courtrooms across the country in lawsuits at-
tempting to remedy intrastate and intradistrict disparities in per pupil \expen-
ditures. If money does not matter, so the argument goes, then fiscal disparities
from district to district or school to school do not result in unequal educational
opportunities afforded school children.
The traditional concept that the efficacy of schools is linked substantially
to expenditures is, however, not without its defenders. Those defenders con-
cede that American society has been naive in its faith that education can cure
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the Serrano v. Priest school finance litigation in which a trial court decision in favor of plaintiffs
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tDepartment of Education and Center for the Study of Evaluation, University of California
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'J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN
REPORT].
2 See Hodgson, Do Schools Make a Difference?, 231 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1973, at 35-46.
3 See generally ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (D. Moynihan & F. Mosteller
eds. 1972).
4 C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972).
' That an attempt was made to do so is suggested in Moynihan, Sources of Resistence to the Cole-
man Report, 38 HARv. EDUC. REv. 23 (1968).
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evei-y social ill, but urge that a reprieve be granted before discarding the tra-
ditional importance attached to schooling. They also point to countervailing
social science research which supports the existence of a relationship between
cost and quality.
The focus of this article is on the appropriateness of using the judicial
process as a forum for resolving the cost-quality debate in educational fi-
nance. The relationship between social science and public policy has always been
less than amicable, which is perhaps as it should be. But the courtroom is a nar-
rower and more rigidly circumscribed context in which to resolve the tension
between science and policy than are the legislative and administrative arenas.
Principled adjudication adorns itself with techniques which avoid infringing
upon legislative prerogatives. Where, as here, satisfactory definitions of equal
educational opportunity are elusive and where the impenetrable jargon of
science threatens the proper functioning of the adversary process, courts jus-
tifiably should be loath to intervene in matters relating to the financing of
public education. The challenge to the school finance reform lawyer, and the
purpose of this essay, is to discover some intermediate ground, some judicially
manageable standard, which permits the judicial machinery to operate, but
avoids settling the scientific dispute. That search here proceeds in three steps:
first, existing judicial standards of educational opportunity are examined;
second, the viability of pupil performance on standardized tests as a measure
of school output is discussed; and finally, litigation strategies for resolving
the cost-quality debate are suggested.
JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF EQUALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Defining equality of educational opportunity is a hazardous undertaking
where there exists no social consensus as to the proper role of schools.6
Judicial response under such circumstances is predictably poor--courts in
school finance litigation, in the absence of Coleman Report-type evidence on
school outputs, often assume a cost-quality relationship;7 other courts accept
such evidence at face value in rejecting plaintiffs' claims. 8 Seldom does the
adversary process work effectively. Nevertheless, past judicial attempts to
construct standards of equality of educational opportunity offer an introduction
to the available options. Eight different standards have been considered: (1) equal
dollars per pupil; (2) dollars adjusted according to pupil needs; (3) lack of
judicially manageable standards; (4) maximum variable ratio; (5) negative
standard; (6) inputs; (7) outputs; and (8) minimum adequacy.'
6 Educators have not satisfactorily defined the concept of equal educational opportunity,
perhaps because the concept is not static, but evolutionary. Professor Coleman has noted the change
in expectations of schools: increasingly, our society has come to rely on schools to solve complex
social problems such as poverty, crime, and racial discrimination. Coleman, The Concept of Equality
of Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC. REV. 7 (1968).
"Presumably students receiving a $1000 education are better educated that [sic] those ac-
quiring a $600 schooling." McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem.
sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
8 See Jensen v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, No. 24,474 (Ind. Cir. Ct., Jan. 15, 1973).
9 In 1968, Arthur Wise suggested nine definitions of equality of educational opportunity:
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A. McInnis v. Shapiro
1. Equal Dollars Versus Educational Needs
The first three standards are amply illustrated in Mclnnis v. Shapiro,'0
where plaintiffs attacked the interdistrict expenditure inequalities of the Illinois
school financing system. Plaintiffs claimed that the fourteenth amendment
commanded that expenditures be distributed only on the basis of the educa-
tional needs of pupils. The court first rejected any rigid dollar equality standard
of educational opportunity, noting that expenditures are not "the' exclusive
yardstick of a child's educational needs."" Perhaps the only point of agreement
on the part of educators, courts, and laymen is that a "one-dollar one-scholar"
measure of equality is inappropriate. Absolute dollar equality would ignore
variations in costs and educational needs from district to district. Fear was
also expressed in Mclnnis that leveling high-expenditure districts downward
would produce uniform mediocrity and stifle local experimentation.' 2 No court
has ever adopted such a standard; even courts which find a relationship between
cost and quality, and regard dollar expenditures as one relevant criterion
for measuring equal educational opportunity, disavow that an equal-dollar-
per-pupil solution is in any way legally required. 3 Moreover, because the
reasons for appropriate expenditure disparities are several, a "needs only"
standard of expenditure distribution was also unacceptable in Mclnnis. A
standard was needed which was flexible enough to accommodate competing
fiscal claims, a standard in other words which was consistent with some
acceptable concept of proportional equality (the principle ofjustified inequality).
2. Lack of Judicially Manageable Standards
Yet the articulation of such a standard was thought in Mclnnis to be "a
basic policy decision more appropriately handled by a legislature than a court."'
4
Complaining that educational need was a "nebulous concept" beyond judicial
competence to define, the court refused to decide the case on its merits.'
5
A similar result was reached in Burrus v. Wilkerson,16 where the court, in up-
holding Virginia's system of school financing declared, "courts have neither
the knowledge nor the means nor the power to allocate the public monies to
(1) negative, (2) full-opportunity, (3) foundation, (4) minimum-attainment, (5) leveling, (6) com-
petition, (7) equal-dollars-per-pupil, (8) maximum variance ratio, and (9) classification. A. WISE,
RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS 143-59 (1968). Wise's standards have been criticized as being too
vague for judicial use, Kirp, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 908, 915 (1969), yet courts again and
again have utilized these standards, or variations thereof.
10 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969).
11 293 F. Supp. at 335.12 Id. at 331 n.l1.
13 In holding the state's system of financing schools unconstitutional, a lower court in Idaho said
that the state is not "obligated to insure that all districts have the same dollar input per pupil.
The state may recognize differences in educational costs so long as the differences are based on
relevant economic and educational factors." Thompson v. Engelking, Civil No. 47,055 (Idaho
Dist. Ct., Nov. 16, 1973).
14 293 F. Supp. at 332.
15 Id. at 335.
16 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
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fit the varying needs of these students throughout the state."17 Thus, to be
successful, school finance litigants must construct a standard for measuring
equality of educational opportunity which permits appropriate expenditure
variations but which is also judicially manageable.
B. Maximum Variable Ratio
One solution is a maximum variable ratio standard for measuring equality.
Such a standard, while essentially arbitrary, would permit expenditure vari-
ations within a specified range, thereby providing school districts with some fi-
nancial flexibility in responding to local problems. One court suggested, but
did not order, that variations in operating expenditures due to local initiative
might be permissible "to the extent of 10 percent or 15 percent of the level
of income guaranteed for the district by the state in any year."18 The variable
ratio approach can be combined with existing categorical aid programs so as to
apply only to ordinary operating expenditures. Hence, in Hobson v. Hansen,1 9
a case involving between-school disparities in per pupil expenditures within
a single school district, Judge J. Skelly Wright, ordered that disparities in
per pupil expenditures for teachers' salaries not exceed a five per cent variation
except for "adequate justification," which was defined to include compensatory
and special education programs. Yet a maximum variable ratio approach is
fraught with problems. The standard assumes the adequacy of the state-
guaranteed minimum above which expenditures may vary; if the assumption
is false and the ratio is set too low, then the policy demand would become in-
tense. The standard is probably unworkable unless special categorical programs
and capital outlays are excluded. There is also the problem of deciding upon
an appropriate ratio. If the ratio is set too high, serious inequalities will result;
if set too low, the system will be unresponsive. Because of the lack of standards
with which to make these judgments, ajudicial solution of this nature, involving
as it must the imposition of a particular method of school finance upon the
legislature, raises serious separation of powers issues.
C. Negative Standards
A possible way of dealing with the issue of equality of educational oppor-
tunity in school finance litigation is to define what equality of educational
opportunity is not, limiting one's examination to what a state may not do in
the distribution of educational revenues, rather than ordering what a state
must do. The "fiscal neutrality" principle of Professors Coons, Clune and
Sugarman is the outstanding example of the negative standard approach.2 0
Fiscal neutrality means that expenditure disparities resulting from differences
in local district taxable wealth are unlawful, or in the terminology of its pro-
ponents, "[t]he quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than
17 d. at 574.
18 Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Wyo. 1971), juris.
relinq., 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972).
19 327 F. Supp. 844, 863-64 (D.D.C. 1971).
20 J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
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the wealth of the state as a whole."12 1 A negative fiscal neutrality standard sat-
isfies the requirement of flexibility because it does not require exact dollar
equality. Although the standard implicitly assumes a cost-quality relationship
with respect to the dollar variance among districts caused by wealth differences,
expenditures may fluctuate among districts for any reason other than district
wealth. The question of what differences other than wealth are legitimate
is left unanswered, a real advantage to a court which desires to avoid deciding
that larger question. Fiscal neutrality, in other words, satisfies the require-
ment of a judicially manageable standard, for a court need not itself define
what equal educational opportunity is in all of its dimensions. Judicial concern
is concentrated solely upon wealth-produced expenditure disparities.
Yet the fiscal neutrality standard, although achieving some success in state
and lower federal courts,2 2 was rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in San Antonio Independent School District v. RodrigueZ23 and has been the subject
of sharp criticism from commentators, partly for not going far enough,24 partly
for going too far,25 and partly because the solution tendered by the Coons
team-"district power equalizing"-was unacceptable. 26 A common criticism
is that under a power equalized school finance system, expenditures will still
vary, not according to wealth, but according to tax rate. Whereas Professor
Coons would justify what he admits would be qualitative differences in a power
equalized system on the basis of local control, others have found that claim
inconsistent with the asserted fundamentality of education, for it would allow
a child's education to be poorer where the community was feckless. Perhaps
a more satisfactory approach would be to expand the negative standard to
include other inequities. In any event, the negative definition of equality of
educational opportunity, so long as there is consensus on what does not justify
expenditure disparities, should be regarded as a viable judicial approach to
measuring equality.
D. Inputs
A sixth measure of equal educational opportunity is "inputs"-equality
in the level of educational resources (which may vary in price between districts)
brought to bear on a child's education. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rodriguez,
suggested such a standard: "the question of discrimination in educational
quality must be deemed to be an objective one that looks to what the State
provides its children, not to what the children are able to do with what they
21 Id. at 2.
22 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971);
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Caldwell v. Kansas, Civil No. 50,616 (Kan. Cir. Ct., Aug. 30,
1972).
23411 U.S. 1 (1973).
24 Berke & Callahan, Serrano v. Priest; Milestone or Millstone for School Finance, 21 J. PUB. L.
23 (1972).
22 Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REv.
1227 (1973); Goldstein, Interdistrict Irregularities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano
v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972).
26 Michelson, What Is a 'Just" System for Financing Schools? An Evaluation of Alternative Reforms,
38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 436 (1974).
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receive. '27 Marshall, noting the disparities in teacher training, teacher-student
ratio, and other resource inputs, argued that "[d]iscrimination in the oppor-
tunity to learn that is afforded a child must be our standard." 28
Marshalrs focus upon objective educational inputs is firmly rooted in
separate-but-equal cases such as Sweatt v. Painter where inputs, both tangible
and intangible, were the standard of equality in comparing the University
of Texas School of Law with the separate black law school:
[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered
white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty,
variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body,
scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University
of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school. Such qualities, to name a few, include reputation of the faculty, experi-
ence of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had
a free choice between these schools would consider the question close.29
More recently, Judge Wright in Hobson v. Hansen declared that "if whites and
blacks, or rich and poor, are to be consigned to separate schools pursuant
to whatever policy, the minimum that the Constitution will require and guar-
antee is that for their objectively measurable aspects these schools be run on the
basis of real equality."30 Although an objective approach is certainly desirable,
an inputs standard, without more, not only fails to respond to countervailing
scientific research as to the educational consequences of input disparities, but
is subject to the same objections as an equal dollar standard. Equality of in-
puts is either a rigid standard which does not permit variations to meet special
needs or costs, or, if variations are to be permitted, leaves the judiciary with-
out adequate standards to determine when equality has been achieved.
E. Outputs
A seventh definition of equality of educational opportunity is "outputs";
the effects of different educational investments are gauged in terms of pupil
performance on standardized achievement tests. On the basis of social science
research which finds an insignificant relationship between variation in ex-
penditures and variation in test scores, the argument is made that disparities
in expenditures do not result in unequal educational opportunities. Courts
which have been confronted with social science evidence of this sort have dem-
onstrated an inability to deal with it adequately, largely because such evidence
often goes unrebutted. 3 1 Seldom has the adversary process worked effectively
so as to permit serious and thoughtful judicial examination of the cost-quality
issue. The evidence presented is often only the tip of the social science iceberg,
27 411 U.S. at 84.
2 8 Id.
29 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950).
20 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (D.D.C. 1967).
31 Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct., June 1, 1972), rev'd, 110 Ariz. 88,
515 P.2d 590 (1973); Jensen v. State Bd. of Tax Comnm'rs, No. 24,474 (Ind. Cir. Ct., Jan. 15, 1973);
Robinson v. Cahin, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
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and often not analyzed carefully or expertly by lawyers on either side or by
judges. Judicial opinions treat the social science evidence curtly and shallowly,
and demonstrate a crucial lack of appreciation for the myriad issues inherent
therein. The alien and imposing terminology of science has often found lawyers
woefully unsuited to perform their adversary role and led judges to take the
seeming certainty of numbers in blind faith. The intersection of law and social
science is one of tension, nowhere more so than in educational inequality lit-
igation. Before an outcome definition of equality is deemed acceptable, a
more careful examination is due that intersection.
F. Minimum Adequacy
A final standard of equal educational opportunity is the one employed
by the majority in Rodriguez 32 -minimum adequacy. In most states, a foundation
program financing scheme is utilized, based on the premise that the state
should guarantee every pupil with a "foundation program for adequate financ-
ing of all educational services. '33 Above that level, districts are free to spend
as they wish, but the revenue must be raised locally. A minimum adequacy
definition predicates the foundation program as the limit of the state's re-
sponsibility for providing equality in its educational offering. So long as the
state provides every child with a minimally adequate education, differences in
spending beyond that specified minimum are not legally significant. The
adequacy standard is manageable, it does not forbid expenditure differences,
and it allows courts neatly to avoid the necessity for resolving the cost-
quality debate. No research challenges the importance of a basic minimum level
of expenditure; the controversy relates, to the educational consequences of
spending inequalities above that basic level. 34 Justice Powell, influenced by
the existence of this controversy, and the lack of judicial tools for resolving
it,35 found an adequacy standard to be the solution to a vexing problem.
Yet, the minimal adequacy perception of equality is not without its dif-
ficulties. First, the adequacy standard does not enable courts to avoid the qual-
itative issue. As Justice Marshall's dissent correctly notes, the majority opinion
does not specify applicable standards for determining what level of expendi-
32 411 U.S. at 25, 37, 45.
33 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17300 (West 1969).
34 [I]t must be stressed again that we are not assessing the absolute effect of schools on
achievement, but rather the effect of schools on variation in achievement levels. We have
no doubt that schools have an overall baseline effect. This baseline effect is probably fairly
uniform for all schools, because school factors may be relatively equalized with respect to
minimum standards. But, given variation in verbal achievement, especially that between
black and white students, we are searching for factors which might reduce the difference.
School factors may be important for a certain basic level of achievement, but this does
not necessarily mean that improving those factors will help bring black achievement closer to
white achievement. If one wants to reduce this differential, Coleman's and our analyses
point to family-background factors as the more promising area for improvement.
Armor, Schools and Family Effects on Black and White Achievement: A Reexamination of the USOE Data,
in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 3, at 225 (emphasis in the original).
35 Justice Powell declared that the judiciary would be "well advised to refrain from interposing
on the states inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued
research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems
and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions." 411 U.S. at 43.
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ture is constitutionally adequate.3 6 Further, what may be adequate for one
type of pupil may not be for another. Disadvantaged or handicapped students
may require expenditures in addition to the foundation program guaranteed
minimum expenditure level, in order to receive an adequate education. De-
termining what those varying levels of adequacy are will require articulation
of manageable standards. To rely upon an equal dollar definition of adequacy
(and the foundation program level of support is generally an equal dollar
result) is no more defensible than to rely upon an equal dollar definition of
quality. Both standards are rigid and fail to permit justifiable variations.
Marshall's criticism of Powell's double standard treatment is telling: "One would
think that the majority would heed its own fervent affirmation of judicial self-
restraint before undertaking the complex task of determining at large what
level of education is constitutionally sufficient.13 7
There is an even more fundamental difficulty with the adequacy definition.
The Texas system of financing public education was upheld because that system
served a rational state purpose, that is, local fiscal control. Yet there is an in-
consistency in using an adequacy standard to avoid resolving the social science
debate while at the same time employing a justification for permitting relative
spending disparities that itself presumes the existence of a cost-quality rela-
tionship. Justice Powell described the importance of local control in the fol-
lowing terms:
In part, local control means... the freedom to devote more money to the
education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity
it offers for participation in the decision-making process that determines
how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local
programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experi-
mentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. 38
Yet local control over financing and, thus, over program planning, occurs
only above the state-guaranteed foundation program minimum expenditure
level. If local control means all that Justice Powell says it does, then a relation-
ship between cost and quality must exist. Local control implies control over
something that has meaningful content. If there is no relationship between
cost and quality, then local control has no meaning and expenditure inequal-
ities which use local control for their justification can have no rational basis.39
For the system to be "rational" (at least if local control is the rational basis
offered), courts must go beyond an adequacy definition of equality. Justice
Powell, in short, has employed a double standard, refusing to decide the cost-
36 d. at 89.
37 Id.
38 d. at 49-50.
39 While the correlation between expenditure per pupil and the quality of education
may be open to argument, the Court must assume here that it is high. To do otherwise
would be to hold that in those wealthy districts where the per pupil expenditure is higher
than some real or imaginary norm, the school boards are merely wasting the taxpayers' money.
The Court is not willing to so hold, absent some strong evidence. Even those who staunchly
advocate that the disparities here complained of are the result of local control and that such
control and taxation with the resulting inequality should be maintained would not be willing
to concede that such local autonomy results in waste or inefficiency.
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D. Minn. 1971).
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quality issue and then presuming the existence of the challenged relationship
in order to justify the system's inequalities.
Because Rodriguez is law for the federal courts, there remains the question
of what measure of inequality resulting from a state's school finance system
will successfully support a federal claim for relief. One can speculate that in
a state where the average per pupil expenditure substantially exceeds the
foundation program minimum, where evidence supports the qualitative in-
adequacy of the minimum expenditure level, where there are demonstrated
inadequacies in the educational programs of low wealth districts, and where
there exists little local option-factors that can currently be demonstrated
in many states-a federal suit might succeed and still be consistent with
Rodriguez.40 State forums, however, are more likely to offer enhanced oppor-
tunities for successful school finance litigation. Whatever the forum, a more
satisfactory approach to the problem of defining and measuring inequality
of educational opportunity needs development.
II
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON THE COST-QUALITY RELATIONSHIP
The judicial standards for equality of educational opportunity provide the
conceptual context in which courts utilize social science research findings such
as those in the Coleman Report.4 1 In this section, we provide a critique of that
40 Focusing upon a specific group of districts in which the programs and opportunities afforded
are inadequate and in which access to the fiscal resources to remedy those inadequacies is effectively
foreclosed will bring an important particularity to interdistrict school finance litigation lacking
in earlier litigation based on the fiscal neutrality principle. The educational process will become
paramount and fiscal issues secondary. The group of districts and children will be smaller in num-
ber than that conceived in previous litigation, but more compelling.
41 The challenge to the effectiveness of different expenditure levels in public education is a
relatively recent development, having its genesis in the 1966 Coleman Report. The Equality of
Educational Opportunity Survey (EEOS), undertaken in 1965 in accordance with a mandate from
Congress to the U.S. Office of Education to conduct a survey "concerning the lack of availability
of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national
origin in public educational institutions," Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-1
(1970), collected an extensive array of data from a sample of 4,000 schools across the country.
Several aspects of school inequality were investigated: (1) inequality in tangible school inputs
(expenditures, facilities, and so on); (2) degree of racial segregation; (3) inequality in intangible
school inputs (for example, teacher expectations); (4) inequality in school outputs as measured
by pupil performance on standardized achievement tests relative to non-school factors; and (5) in-
equality of school output as measured by pupil performance on standardized achievement tests
without regard to non-school factors. See Coleman, supra note 6, at 16-17. The Report was published
in 1966 and its most controversial finding related to the relatively insignificant effect that differential
school resources had upon student outcomes independent of other factors such as home back-
ground..
[Olne implication stands out above all: That schools bring little influence to bear on a child's
achievement that is independent of his background and general social context; and that this
very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their
home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities
with which they confront adult life at the end of school. For equality of educational oppor-
tunity through the schools must imply a strong effect of schools that is independent of
the child's immediate social environment, and that strong independent effect is not present
in American schools.
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research-which relies largely on pupil performance on standardized achieve-
ment tests-and the utility of such research in deciding cases. The critique
concerns four major reasons why input-output statistical analyses using pupil
performance on standardized achievement tests provide an inappropriate
measure of educational output: (1) defects in the tests themselves; (2) the failure
of correlational analyses to match inputs with outputs; (3) inadequacies in
data analysis techniques; and (4) other methodological defects inherent in
correlational analysis.
A. Pupil Performance on Standardized Achievement
Tests as an Index of Educational Output42
An assumption which is implicit in any method of analyzing the relation-
ship between expenditures and achievement is that pupil performance on
standardized achievement tests provides an index of educational "output"
which is useful for comparisons of educational opportunity among school
districts. While there are other educational output measures such as school
drop-out rates, later life income, job status, and delinquency rates, most social
science "output" research relies upon student test scores. Yet there are a range
of problems in the use of such scores to evaluate program and expenditure
effectiveness.
One is that the educational goals measured by these achievement tests,
typically in reading and mathematics, are very limited. The cognitive academic
domain is the only area tested. No tests are administered in the "psychomotor"
domain, which relates to physical skills used in physical education and voca-
tional education. No tests are administered in the "affective" domain, which
includes such educational objectives as citizenship, self-concept, political
socialization, attitudes toward school, maturity, and interpersonal skills.
Even within the cognitive academic domain, many subject areas and goals are
not tested.
A second and more important problem with using standardized achieve-
The Report has been criticized from the standpoint of the data collected as well as its meth-
odology. See, e.g., Bowles & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement-An Appraisal of Some
Recent Evidence, 3 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (1968); Bowles & Levin, More on Multicollinearity and the
. Effectiveness of Schools, 3 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 393 (1968); Cain & Watts, Problems in Making In-
ferences From the Coleman Report (unpublished manuscript, 1968); Hanushek & Kain, On the
Value of Equality of Educational Opportunity as a Guide to Public Policy, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 3, at 116-45. Some reanalyses of the EEOS data were conducted
which indicated that the Report had underestimated the effects of schooling. See, e.g., Hanushek, The
Production of Education, Teacher Quality, and Efficiency, in Do TEACHERS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 79
(1970). But in 1971 Daniel P. Moynihan and Frederick Mosteller published a collection of essays
reflecting a large-scale reanalysis of EEOS data conducted during a year-long Harvard faculty
seminar and, in general, confirming the Coleman Report conclusions. ON EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 3.4 2 The discussion contained herein is derived from the testimony of Dr. Stephen P. Klein in
Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974), Reporter's Transcript, vol. 41,
at 4491-622; id., vol. 42, at 4623-82; id., vol. 45, at 4891-992. In turn, much of this testimony is
based on Klein, The Uses and Limitations of Standardized Tests in Meeting the Demands of
Accountability (UCLA Evaluation Comment, Jan., 1971); and Klein, Evaluating Tests in Terms of
the Information They Provide (UCLA Evaluation Comment, June, 1970). For a discussion of
testing theory, see A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (3d ed. 1968); L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (3d ed. 1970).
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ment tests to evaluate program effectiveness among districts is that achievement
tests commonly do not overlap well with the program objectives of schools even
within the cognitive domain purportedly being tested. An achievement test
in a particular subject, for example, may cover aspects not taught in a particular
school, while on the other hand, a school may cover aspects pertinent to the
subject matter area that are not covered by the test. Hence, the degree of over-
lap between course content and test content will vary from school to school and
district to district.43 As a result, the test instrument is not especially sensitive
to the effects of instruction.
A third problem in using test scores to measure educational quality among
school districts is attributable to poor test design. Confusing directions, in-
structions which strain a child's attention span, lack of uniformity in the ad-
ministration of tests, and ambiguous format all undermine the validity of test
results. The "standardization" of tests is similarly impaired by teaching to the
test, promotion of students to grade levels beyond their ability, and differences
in student test-taking abilities.
The fourth and most serious problem with test results is that of validity, that
is, whether tests measure what is purported to be measured. A reading test,
for example, may be measuring skills other than reading, such as reasoning
or general intellectual ability. Test questions measuring reasoning ability may
be heavily influenced by non-school factors such as home background and
innate ability, and should not be included in a reading test (as distinguished from
an intelligence test) if the "reading test" purports to compare the quality of
instruction in reading among school districts. Test publishers often, con-
sciously or unconsciously, select test questions which involve reasoning ability
in order to spread students out so as to have variations in test scores. Items
which are sensitive to instruction, but which do not produce test score variations,
are excluded.44 In sum, most standardized achievement tests were not con-
structed for the purpose of evaluating program effectiveness; rather, they
were designed to measure general intellectual ability for purposes of making
individual counseling, selection, and classification decisions. Achievement
43 The problem of poor overlap is magnified by the fact that the degree of importance attached
to certain content objectives in standardized achievement tests may vary considerably from the
degree of emphasis placed on the same items within any school. For example, the statewide grade
one mathematics test used in California covers eight content objectives, yet forty-four out of fifty-
five items on the test are devoted to four of the areas, while the other four areas are measured by
only eleven items. As a result, the test does not measure all eight objectives equally well. Even more
disconcerting is the variation in the average difficulty of the items among different content ob-
jectives. On the grade one mathematics test referred to above, two content areas containing
twenty-three items are comparatively easy, while two other areas totalling twenty-one items are
comparatively difficult. Only a total score for all eight content objectives is reported as the pupil's
performance on that test. The test, then, does not really measure how well a student does at
mathematics; it measures how well he or she can answer easy items in two of the eight content areas
and difficult items in two of the other areas. The State Department of Education in California is
now moving away from statewide standardized achievement test scores to a sampling-based testing
procedure to measure attainment of broad educational objectives on a school level rather than a
district level, leaving each district with the responsibility and duty of carrying out its own evaluation
of its own unique objectives. See CALFORNIA ASSEMBLY EDUCATION COMMITTEE, REPORT OF ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON STATEWIDE TESTING PROGRAM 20 (March, 1972).
44 The problem can be illustrated by the following sample items from a commonly used reading
test:
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tests, to the extent that they are really intelligence tests measuring non-
school factors over which the school has no control, are not valid instruments
for the purpose of assessing the outcomes of instruction, because the character-
istics which such tests measure are not necessarily those that are the outcomes
of instruction.45
The usefulness of test scores for comparative purposes is also impaired
by cultural bias.46 On a very simple level, tests are culturally biased in the sense
READ THIS:
A GAME
You say "box" You say "bean"
I say "animal" I say "girl"
You say "fox" You say "Jean"
You say "men"
I say "number"
You say ... "four" "hen" "ten"
You say "head"
I say "food"
You say ... "bread" "cake" "red"
Cooperative Primary Tests, Reading, Form 12A (Educational Testing Service, 1965). These items
do not measure how well a child can read and understand the meaning of words, but how well
he reasons. Tests, in other words, measure many non-school factors such as innate ability and
home background, and these non-school factors may have more influence than school factors on
test performance.
"' Because of the validity problem, it is difficult, if not impossible to interpret what a test score
means. Two children could both receive a score of 27 on a reading test, but one child could answer
20 reading items correctly and 7 reasoning-type items correctly, while the other child answers
only 12 reading items correctly but correctly answers 15 reasoning items. Because the children are
behaving quite differently, the score of 27 means different things for those two children and it is,
therefore, very difficult to evaluate the effects of instruction on these children by referring to the
total test score. This problem is magnified even further when the test scores of all children in a
school district are averaged together to compute an average score for the entire district. When the
district average test score is correlated with some other variable, such as average per pupil expen-
ditures, any resulting correlation is very suspect because of the difficulty of determining whether
the result reflects the effects of instruction or of reasoning ability or of some combination of
both. Since standardized achievement tests are not very sensitive to instruction, and measure general
intellectual ability, which is affected by non-school factors such as family background, it should not
be surprising that family background should correlate higher with achievement scores than school
expenditures.
46 The problem of cultural bias in achievement, aptitude, and intelligence testing for purposes
of making individual sorting decisions in education has generated intense debate within the social
science community. See, e.g., Herrnstein, IQ, 228 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1971, at 43; Jensen,
How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUC. REV. 1 (1969); Kagan,
The IQ Puzzle: What Are We Measuring, 14 INEQUAUTY IN EDUCATION 5 (1973); Williams, Black
Pride, Academic Relevance and Individual Achievement, in CRUCIAL ISSUES IN TESTING 13 (R. Tyler
ed. 1974). That debate has led to successful legal challenges to over-representation of minorities
in lower tracks, Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), and in mentally retarded
classes, Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The
Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705 (1973); Sorgen,
Testing and Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (1974); Comment, Segregation of
Poor and Minority Children Into Classes for the Mentally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L.
REv. 1212 (1973); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and
Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968); Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intel-
ligence Testing of Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEo. L.J. 1027 (1973); Note, Equal Protection and
Intelligence Classifications, 26 STAN. L. REv. 647 (1974); Note, Constitutional Requirements for Standard-
ized Ability Tests Used in Education, 26 VAND. L. REV. 789 (1973).
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that items on the tests may refer to things such as sleds or mitiens which are
not present in the cultural experience and background of many children taking
the test. More significantly, however, standardized achievement tests are norm-
referenced in the sense that the test scores of children or school districts are
compared with the scores of a national or state sample of the normative or
typical student population. As a result, standardized tests generally reflect
the cultural characteristics of white middle class suburban students, partly
because large urban school districts with heavy concentrations of low income and
minority students often decline to be included in the reference sample.47 Thus,
tests may not be as appropriate for certain minority or ethnic groups as they
are for the main body of white students. In addition, the content of the tests
reflects the cultural biases of the test designers, who are also largely white
middle class people. The most egregious type of cultural bias in tests occurs
when the scores of children with English language disabilities are compared with
students whose primary language is English. When that occurs, the test is no
longer standardized and is a qualitatively and quantitatively different test for
different groups of children, based upon their proficiency in English.
In sum, standardized achievement tests which are the basis for social science
input-output studies are misused when devoted to the purpose of making
comparative evaluations of school district programs. The tests are often not
even designed for program evaluation or measuring the effectiveness of ex-
penditures. It is simply inappropriate to use just a few of the currently available
standardized tests to measure all of the important outputs of education.
B. Inadequacy of Expenditure Index: Failure to Match
Specific Inputs and Specific Outputs
A second major difficulty with input-output research is the inadequacy
of the expenditure index used in correlating expenditures with achievement.
Obviously, one does not use a reading test to evaluate the effectiveness of
expenditures relating to the mathematics curriculum. Yet, typically, the attempt
is made to correlate the average expenditure per child for instruction in each
school district with the average test score in that district on a particular achieve-
ment test. A sixth grade reading test score, however, is not an appropriate
measure for all of the programs included in the average instructional expendi-
ture per child since this figure reflects the per child expenditure on salaries
for principals and vice-principals, supervisors, consultants, classroom teachers
including substitutes, counselors, librarians, psychologists, instructional aides,
secretaries, and clerks, as well as direct expenditures for reading instruction.
A reading test can at best only measure.the results obtained from a very small
portion of the resources devoted to a district's educational program. To cor-
relate performance on reading tests with expenditures for a whole host of
programs, goals, services, and materials which have nothing to do with reading
is to use the tests for purposes for which they were never designed. The ex-
penditure indices used by researchers, then, are often inadequate because* they
47 Hanushek &" Kain, supra note 41, at 120.
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fail to adequately match specific inputs with the specific outputs being measured.
A related problem in correlating average district instructional expenditures
with average district test scores is that such an analysis assumes that the same
expenditure per pupil in two districts will have the same effect upon test scores,
no matter how differently funds are spent in the two districts, an assumption
which is hardly justifiable. Many states provide additional funds to small dis-
tricts to offset diseconomies of scale. Thus, a per pupil expenditure of $600
in each of two districts does not necessarily mean that the same amount of
education was purchased.
48
Another difficulty is that the instructional expenditure per child is the
average amount spent on pupils within a district. Yet, the amount spent per
child varies widely from school to school within a district and from classroom
to classroom within a school.49 Comparisons among school districts of per
pupil expenditures fail to take into account these intradistrict and intraschool
variations. When a district's average expenditure per pupil is correlated with
its average achievement test scores, actual input-output relationships may thus
be masked. Such data make it impossible to match specific school inputs to
the individual student, and as a consequence, there can be little precision in
any conclusions drawn from research about the impact of school inputs on
student achievement.5 0
C. Inadequacies of the Data Analysis Techniques
Social science research examines the statistical relationship between student
test scores on standardized achievement tests and school expenditures. These
two variables, expenditures and achievement, are compared with each other in
order to determine the frequency with which higher expenditures occur to-
gether with higher achievement scores. The strength of that statistical associa-
tion is expressed in a correlation coefficient, which may range from - 1.0, a per-
fect negative or inverse correlation, to +1.0, a perfect positive correlation; a
zero correlation implies no relationship at all between the two variables.
Any correlation coefficient expressing the strength of association be-
tween expenditures and achievement represents a statistical relationship
between the two variables, and not necessarily a causal relationship. A positive
correlation between expenditures and achievement, for example, means only
48 The above discussion is a summary of the testimony of Dr. Klein, supra note 42.
49 In Los Angeles Unified School District, expenditures per pupil range from a low of $448.93
in Liberty Boulevard Elementary School to a high of $1,417.08 in 32nd Street Elementary School.
Los ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DisTRiCr, REPORT, EXPENDITURES CLASSIFIED BY SCHOOL FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1972 (March 29, 1973). Even within a school, more money is spent on
some children than others because of different tracking schemes, special education programs,
compensatory education, and so on.
50 This is one of the major defects of the Coleman Report, a measurement error which, ac-
cording to Dr. James Guthrie, fails to "pick up the real world with sufficient precision to enable
us to know much about the real world ... because such averaging of data disguises more reality
than it discloses," and is a research problem "so serious ... as simply to erode the validity of...
[any] findings." Testimony of Dr. James W. Guthrie, Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974), Reporter's Transcript, vol. 38, at 1481-82. See also Bowles & Levin,
The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement-An Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, supra note 41, at 8-9.
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that, as expenditures vary upward or downward, so also do achievement scores;
that higher expenditures in fact cause higher achievement scores is not implied
and does not necessarily follow from a positive correlation.
The correlation coefficient, which has been used as the criterion in the
cost-quality issue, supposedly indicates the degree of relationship between
expenditures and student performance. If expenditures and student per-
formance were perfectly correlated with one another in the "real world,"
then three conditions would have to prevail in order for researchers to obtain
a positive 1.00 correlation coefficient (any deviation from these assumptions
would lower the correlation coefficient): (1) a perfect linear relationship
between the indices of expenditures and achievement (for example, for every
$0.03 spent on education, there is a corresponding increase in achievement
of exactly 2 points); (2) reliable and valid indices of expenditures and student
achievement, with no chance or systematic errors in the recording of these
data prior to or during the correlation analysis; and (3) the absence of any
influence by other intervening variables such as the sagacity of the decisions
influencing how money is spent. If any one or a combination of these assump-
tions is not fully met, then the correlation coefficient between the indices of
expenditures and achievement will necessarily be less than 1.00. Yet, because
of the nonlinearity of the test scores in measuring student performance, it
is unlikely that there will be a corresponding increase in test scores for each
additional dollar spent. In addition, as demonstrated above, the indices of
both expenditures and achievement are inadequate. It is also likely that a
number of intervening variables will affect the relationship between expendi-
tures and student performance. For example, it is reasonable to assume that
educational decision-making varies in quality from school to school simply
because all school administrators are not equally intelligent or experienced.
One can imagine a situation in which there were high expenditures per pupil
but low student performance as a result of relatively poor (or unlucky) de-
cisions affecting how the money was spent. On the other hand, having a wise
decision-maker with inadequate funds could also mean low student perfor-
mance. Student performance will be high, therefore, only when both the de-
cisions affecting how the money is spent are good (or lucky) and adequate
financial resources are available to implement those decisions. Thus a high
expenditure level may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for high
levels of student performance.
Because the quality of decision-making influences student performance and
because the degree of influence is related to expenditures in a systematic non-
linear fashion, a "triangular" rather than a symmetrical distribution of school
means is produced when the relationship of expenditures is plotted against
student test scores. This type of distribution is illustrated in Figure I, in which
it is assumed that expenditures and performance are measured with complete
accuracy. If the figure were an accurate reflection of the relationship between
test scores and expenditures, then the correlation coefficient associated with
this relationship would be no higher than 0.50.














Low Level of Expenditures
FIGURE 1
Hypothetical relationship between student performance and expenditure when the quality of
educational decision-making has a systematic nonlinear effect upon performance.
The addition of each intervening variable (a variable that has a linear or
nonlinear effect on one or both of the two primary variables being correlated)
will have the effect of decreasing the correlation coefficient between expendi-
tures and student performance. Since there are a host of factors that might
have an impact on the relationship between expenditures and performance,
there is small likelihood of finding a statistically significant correlation between
these expenditures and student test scores. Thus, even though there may be
a very strong underlying relationship between expenditures and student per-
formance, the presence of numerous chance and systematic (intervening)
variables affecting this relationship essentially precludes obtaining a significant
positive expenditure-performance correlation coefficient.
D. Methodological Defects
The accuracy of input-output research studies is further impaired by other
substantial methodological defects. One such defect is the "cross-sectional" na-
ture of the research; that is, the relationship between inputs and outputs is ex-
amined at one point in time, comparing, for example, average expenditures per
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child with average eighth grade reading achievement for a given year. Such cross-
sectional research by definition ignores the cumulative effect of school resources
upon achievement, thereby assuming that the amount of resources received
in each of the seven years prior to the year of testing is the same as that received
in the year of testing. To state the point differently, cross-sectional research
assumes that any differences in inputs received in prior years did not have any
impact on the output measured in grade eight. A longitudinal analysis, by con-
trast, would compare the change in achievement between grades one and eight
with the actual school resources that the student has received between grades
one and eight. This type of analysis enables one to measure growth in achieve-
ment over time, which is not measurable with a cross-sectional analysis. A model
of the educational process which ignores the school resources received by a
student prior to the year of testing not only is defective in its description of
the way the educational process operates, but also masks the cumulative effect
of school resources on achievement. 51 The few longitudinal analyses so far
conducted have found significant relationships between school inputs and stu-
dent achievement. 52
Another defect of input-output research is that it is typically conducted
through the use of survey questionnaires which measure "status" variables
rather than "process" variables. Rather than going into the classroom and
examining how teachers actually behave, the researcher reports on certain
characteristics of teachers such as the number of years of teaching experience,
teachers' education, or teachers' verbal abilities, which are believed to cor-
respond with how teachers behave. Teacher verbal ability is often used in
determining the effect of teachers on pupil achievement. Yet verbal ability
based on a multiple choice vocabulary test is primarily a measure of IQ or in-
tellectual ability. In controlled experimental studies, teacher intelligence has
proved to be poorly related to teacher effectiveness; thus such a status variable
may be inappropriate to evaluate the effect of teachers on student achievement.
Teacher behavior in the classroom is the more appropriate variable to be con-
sidered.
A third significant methodological problem is that of "multicollinearity."
A simple correlation between two variables such as expenditures and achieve-
ment does not eliminate the effects which other unconsidered variables may
be having on the results; in order to determine the independent effect which
schools have on achievement, it is necessary to disentangle the effect which
other variables such as home background, innate ability, peer group composi-
tion, and motivation have upon achievement. The statistical procedure often
51 Testimony of Dr. James W. Guthrie, id. at 4167-68; Testimony of Dr. Nathan Gage, id.,
vols. 46-47, at 5000-184.
52 A study of third grade students in a California school district, see Hanushek, supra note 41,
at 88, which used achievement and school input data for the first three grades, classified students
ethnically and by socioeconomic status, based on the occupation of the father. For white students,
teachers' verbal ability and recentness of teachers' educational experience were significantly re-
lated to achievement. Another study which looked at eighth grade students in a small school
district found the quality of teacher undergraduate institution, teacher experience, and teacher
salary to be important. See testimony of Dr. Donald Winkler, Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254
(Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974), Reporter's Transcript, vol. 40, at 4360-493.
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used to attempt this disentanglement is a "regression analysis," a technique
which seeks to measure the independent effect of each variable upon achieve-
ment. One type of regression analysis employed by the Coleman research
team, the "multiple stepwise regression analysis," is not an appropriate technique
for determining the unique effect of schools upon achievement because home
and school environment are highly intercorrelated with each other, or "col-
linear," and thus tend to measure the same things.53 In a stepwise regression
analysis, variables are entered into the analysis one at a time; because of multi-
collinearity, however, the effect of selected variables upon pupil achievement
is very sensitive to, and depends entirely upon, the order in which the variables
are entered. For example, home environment variables, if entered first, may
explain thirty-six per cent of the variance in student achievement, while school
variables, if entered second, may explain only one and a half per cent, leading to
the conclusion that school inputs are not very important in explaining dif-
ferences in student achievement. If the order of entry is reversed, however,
school variables may explain thirty-six per cent of the variation in student
achievement. Because home and school environment are highly collinear, much
of the influence which the variable entered second has on achievement will be
"captured" by the variable entered first. The presence of collinearity thus acts
as a bar to a determination of school factors upon achievement.
E. Conclusions
In sum, considering the substantial problems arising from the use of stan-
dardized achievement test scores as measures of educational opportunity among
school districts, and the substantial methodological difficulties in attempting
to correlate school inputs with school outcomes, it seems unwise to use an out-
put measure of equality of educational opportunity among school districts. 4
For purposes of litigation on the issue of educational inequality, social
science output research arguably can be deemed legally irrelevant. Under the
equal protection clause, the concern is whether government treats people
equally, not with making people equal and not with equality of results emanat-
ing from a distributed benefit, for the latter may be beyond the capacity and
power of governments and schools to control. Where equality and equal pro-
tection analysis are concerned, the focus is upon the rationality and fairness
of how government distributes benefits, not with what people do with those
benefits. Input-output research is irrelevant to that inquiry. Before deciding
"See Bowles & Levin, More on Multicollinearity and the Effectiveness of Schools, supra note 41,
at 393.
5' Not all social science research on the relationship between expenditures and achievement
is negative. Cross-sectional studies both before and subsequent to the Coleman Report have found
significant positive relationships between certain school inputs and student achievement. See
Guthrie, A Survey of School Effectiveness Studies, in Do TEACHERS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 25 (1970).
Several of these studies were reanalyses of Coleman Report data which compensated for some of
the Report's statistical and methodological weakness. See generally Do TEACHERS MAKE A DIF-
FERENCE? (1970). Other reanalyses of the Coleman Report, however, have confirmed its conclusion.
See, e.g., Armor, School and Family Effects on Black and White Achievement: A Reexamination of the
USOE Data, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 3, at 168; Jencks, The
Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in id. at 69; Smith, Equality of Educational Opportunity:
The Basic Findings Reconsidered, in id. at 230.
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that education itself is irrelevant, which is the logical result of saying dollars
do not make a difference, important avenues of improvement must genuinely
be exhausted. Until this is done, this society should not mortgage away tomor-
row's human capital-and certainly not on the basis of exploratory research
findings more defective than informative.
III
LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE COST-QUALITY DEBATE
A. A Negative Inputs Standard
The preceding analysis of the social science research evidence may simply
confirm the wisdom of regarding the qualitative issue, and the cases in which
it is raised, as non-justiciable because of a lack of judicially manageable stan-
dards. Yet it would be unfortunate if this scientific debate removed disputes
from the judicial process. Although courts are expected to reach correct and
just decisions, a far more essential function of courts is to settle disputes as
best they can. It is particularly important that arbitrary inequalities in the way
government treats individuals not be removed from judicial inquiry simply
because there exists an unresolved and perhaps unresolvable scientific dispute
over the effects of that differential treatment. No one would suggest that de
jure segregation should now be viewed as non-justiciable because recent social
science research challenges the importance of any harmful effects that attending
segregated schools may have upon children.
5 5
Given the standards of educational opportunity delineated in Part I of
this article, what judicial approach is most likely to achieve equity in light of
the scientific dispute discussed in Part II? Straightforward definitions of equal
educational opportunity must give way to hybrid solutions and a multiplicity
of approaches developed to meet varying contexts.
Basically, we believe that a negative inputs or expenditures standard of
equal educational opportunity should be adopted. An inputs standard defines
and evaluates educational opportunities in terms of the programs, services,
and facilities made available to children, and thus is a "school concept" of edu-
cational opportunities. Inputs are chosen because the focus is upon what the
state provides to the child, not on what the child does with what the state
provides him, as that is beyond the power of the school to control. The word
"quality" should perhaps be avoided, for that connotes an attribute that goes
beyond opportunity, beyond what the school itself provides.
An inputs standard alone would require an equal dollar revenue distribu-
tion; hence the negative standard is more appropriate. The focus is upon what
the state must not do, not upon what it must do or how it must distribute
dollars and resources. The concern is only with expenditure or input inequal-
ities that lack rational justification, such as wealth-created disparities. The
state is left free to vary expenditures and inputs in order to reflect variations
in costs and needs.
5 CahnJurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 150, 157-58, 167 (1955).
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We are not so disingenuous as to suggest that eliminating unjustified fiscal
disparities will achieve equal educational opportunity in all of its dimensions.
A negative inputs standard will, however, preserve the dispute-settling
function of the judiciary while at the same time being mindful of judicial
limitations. While schools cannot be held responsible for the test performance
of children, they can be held accountable for the quality of the school services
provided, the "inputs" to the educational process. Schools cannot make
children equal, but what they provide to children can be made equal, with
appropriate adjustments for special problems such as the need for com-
pensatory, vocational, and special education. Money, of course, is not the whole
answer, but with it a district can purchase the needed inputs to attain educational
excellence. Opinions vary on how districts can most wisely and efficiently
invest their fiscal resources to achieve the highest possible quality of educational
opportunity. But there is not disagreement that the level of resources available
to a district is an ever-present factor which constrains a district's effort to
perform its mission. Equality of fiscal resources is a threshold requirement for
achieving equality of educational opportunity.
B. Application of the Standard
Proof of the input-opportunity relationship in the affirmative case should
be limited to demonstrating existing inequalities in inputs and to presenting
testimony of school personnel on the educational consequences of input dis-
parities. 56 Social science research evidence should be avoided during the
affirmative case and held for rebuttal, a strategy consistent with the notion
that output research is not relevant to equal protection analysis. Input evidence
should alone establish a prima facie case of inequality of educational oppor-
tunity. Plaintiffs should prevail where no social science evidence is offered
to rebut the input-opportunity relationship or where such evidence is deemed
legally irrelevant.
The cost-quality relationship may also be regarded as admitted, because
of the conduct of the state in encouraging spending above the foundation plan,
and the testimony of state and local defendants that expenditures beyond the
foundation program can be important educationally if spent wisely. Asser-
tions by the defendants regarding the value of local control also represent
an admission on the cost-quality issue, for the very concept of local control
presupposes a relationship between cost and educational quality.
Where social science research evidence is offered in school finance litigation
to rebut the input-opportunity relationship, and that evidence is accepted by
the trial court in resolving the cost-quality issue, the burden of proof can be
shifted to defendants who are challenging the legislative declaration of fact
underlying the entire financing structure, that is, that money matters. In
effect, in school finance litigation plaintiffs are contending that there are no
rational bases for those explicit and implicit statutory declarations. If the state
is to be permitted to question what should be viewed as legislative factual
"' Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 78-108, Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Apr. 10, 1974).
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determinations, then the burden of proof in such an inquiry should properly
rest with the party challenging the validity of such statutes.5 7
Defendants' research evidence should be rejected for still another reason.
Wealth-created expenditure disparities have been defended on the ground that
the school finance system advances the state interest in encouraging local
fiscal control, an argument that was accepted by the United States Supreme
Court in Rodriguez. Yet there is an inconsistency between defending the system
on the basis of local control and contending that cost and quality are not re-
lated. As already argued, if expenditure disparities above some base level
expenditure have no educational consequence, then local control has no
meaning and there would be no state interest which would validate the fi-
nancing system. If the state purports to defend the system's irregularities on
the basis that expenditures above some minimum level are, in effect, wasted,
then the local control justification ought not to be available to it or, alternatively,
the state should bear the burden of proof in demonstrating the rationality
of the local control justification.
CONCLUSION
The strategies offered here for measuring equality and for resolving the
cost-quality issue are specific, practical, and operational-designed solely
for the narrow context of the judicial process. No specific school finance
system is proposed as a remedy; that is the function of the legislature.
Our suggestions are intended simply to preserve the dispute-settling function
of the legal process against a threatened erosion by the intimidating aura of
scientific certainty.
37 Such an approach was used in Natonabah v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (D.N.M.
1973); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (N.D. Cal. 1972); and Hobson v. Hansen, 327
F. Supp. 844, 860-61 (D.D.C. 1971).
